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ABSTRACT—Aesthetic judgments are “dangerous undertakings” for courts,
but they are unavoidable in copyright law. In theory, copyright does not
distinguish between works on the basis of aesthetic values or merit (or lack
thereof), and courts often go to great lengths to try to avoid artistic
judgments. In practice, however, implicit aesthetic criteria are deeply
embedded throughout copyright case law. The questions “What is art?” and
“How should it be interpreted?” are inextricably linked to the questions
“What does copyright protect?,” “Who is an author?,” “What is
misappropriation?,” and many other issues essential to copyright. Although
courts rarely (if ever) explicitly adhere to aesthetic principles in their
decisions, the judicial logic used in copyright cases closely mirrors three
major aesthetic theories: Formalism, Intentionalism, and Reader-Response.
Unfortunately for courts, these theories are largely incompatible.
Furthermore, none are sufficiently expansive to cover the variety of
practices contained within a single artistic tradition, let alone the panoply
of expressive mediums protected by copyright law. As a result, doctrinal
inconsistencies abound (both inter- and intra-circuit), and the case law
largely fails to provide clear guidance as to the scope of protection—and
risk of liability—associated with different artistic practices. This Article
examines how courts have applied aesthetic theories to resolve doctrinal
issues concerning copyright eligibility, derivative works, useful articles,
and statutory fair use. Based on this analysis, this Article argues that courts
should adopt a uniform approach to aesthetic judgments from the
perspective of a hypothetical “Community of Practice” capable of situating
an expressive work in a specific artistic context.
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INTRODUCTION
While courts have little difficulty navigating through dense thickets of
economics,1 psychology,2 science,3 and religious literature,4 they become
utterly flummoxed when confronted with works of art.5 This is a curious
phenomenon because many judges are broadly conversant in art,6 and
artistic interpretation is quite similar to the textual exegesis that is inherent
to judicial practice.7 Yet, time and again, courts declare that they must
1

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014).
See, e.g., Bernard L. Diamond, From M’Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189,
190–91, 196 (1962) (discussing the application of psychology to criminal law).
3
See, e.g., David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to
Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—And Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of
Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (discussing the law’s use of scientific literature).
4
See, e.g., Bruce J. Casino, Note, “I Know It When I See It”: Mail-Order Ministry Tax Fraud and
the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable Definition of Religion, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 113, 130–35
(1987) (discussing the Supreme Court’s attempts to define religion).
5
While many examples discussed in this Article are drawn from the cases involving visual arts
(e.g., painting, sculpture, photography, etc.), the analysis presented is equally applicable to other types
of creative work covered by copyright, except where otherwise noted. As such, the word “art” is used in
its broadest sense.
6
See, e.g., Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 111 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (providing
a 296-word footnote with a complete art-historical iconography of the “Venus Pudica” pose in a
comparison of an Annie Leibovitz photograph of the actress Demi Moore and Botticelli’s Birth of
Venus); see also Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–51 (1903) (referencing
artists Velasquez, Whistler, Rembrandt, Degas, Goya, and Manet, and the art critic John Ruskin).
7
Modern legal theory borrows heavily from aesthetic theory, particularly literary criticism,
especially as applied to textual determinacy, the analysis of legislative intent, and the role of judges.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 276–319 (3d ed. 2009); Robin West,
Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145,
203–06 (1985) (discussing aesthetic theory); James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from
Literature, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014, 2023 (1989) (explaining the importance of literary criticism as
applied to law).
2
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abstain from making aesthetic judgments8 on the basis that they are
incompetent to do so,9 and that any artistic definition or interpretation they
might offer would be subject to the whims of personal taste. Art, it seems,
is like obscenity: it is something courts know when they see, but can’t
speak about intelligibly.10
This rather hyperbolic judicial posture11 derives from the Supreme
Court’s 1903 decision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.12 This
case has come to stand for the proposition that copyright protection is not
predicated on the artistic merits of a work—i.e., copyright is not concerned
with whether a work sits high or low on the brow.13 This part of the
Bleistein opinion is uncontroversial. However, Justice Holmes, writing for
the Court, went on to expound on the proper role of judges when faced with
aesthetic controversy:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.14

In the hundred-plus years since Bleistein was decided, courts have
refined Justice Holmes’s admonition against the “dangerous undertaking”
of artistic judgments into an interpretative principle termed the “doctrine of
avoidance.”15 This doctrine holds that law and art serve discordant cultural
functions: law is concerned with providing social stability, whereas art is
unpredictable and challenging to social conventions.16 Furthermore, courts
are not specifically “trained” in artistic assessment, and so are “illequipped” to address aesthetic questions.17 For these reasons, among
8

In this Article, the terms “artistic” and “aesthetic” are used synonymously. Aesthetic theory
denotes the branch of philosophy concerned with the interpretation and meaning of art. See generally
AESTHETICS: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (George Dickie et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989).
9
See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 814 (2005) (“Another reason
advanced for shunning artistic determinations is that the judiciary has no particular competence to
assess artistic merit.”).
10
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (when faced with the
task of “trying to define what may be indefinable,” Justice Stewart famously declared, “I shall not today
attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But
I know it when I see it . . . .”).
11
See infra Part III.
12
188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (holding that commercial illustrations are “art” for the purpose of
copyright protection).
13
That courts do not distinguish between “high” and “low” forms of artwork in determining the
scope of copyright protection is often referred to as the Bleistein nondiscrimination principle.
14
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
15
See Farley, supra note 9, at 815.
16
See generally ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING REPRESENTATION (Brian Wallis ed., 1984)
(presenting critical essays discussing culturally provocative practices in postmodern art).
17
Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980) (“The question of what is art is
inherently subjective, as ‘it is nevertheless often true that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.’ It
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others,18 courts refuse to explicitly state aesthetic opinions on the basis that
doing so would discriminate in favor of one interpretation of art over
another,19 which could result in chilling effects on speech20 and a covert
form of censorship.21
If only courts could follow their own prescription. Despite frequent
insistence to the contrary, the very types of subjective and qualitative
assessments that Bleistein and its progeny sought to avoid are inextricable
from copyright law.22 For instance, aesthetic judgment is required to
determine whether independent contributions have “merged into
inseparable . . . parts of a unitary whole” for purposes of assigning joint
ownership to a copyright and what (if any) part of the design of a useful
article is “capable of existing independently of . . . the utilitarian aspects of
the article.”23 In addition, to determine the scope of copyright protection,
courts must apply the idea/expression dichotomy24 and the scènes à faire
doctrine.25 These doctrines necessitate filtering out original expression from
unprotectable ideas and stock elements. This involves an appreciation of
which artistic concepts are novel and which are customary to a work’s
necessarily follows that courts are ill equipped to determine such illusory and imponderable
questions . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir.
1999) (“We are not art critics, do not pretend to be and do not need to be to decide this case.”).
18
See infra Part II.
19
See, e.g., Brandir Int’l Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 n.3 (2d Cir. 1987);
see also Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic
Expression, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1499, 1548–50 (1996) (arguing that art and law are inherently
incompatible in an analysis of attempts to exempt art from the category of obscene material).
20
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582–83 (1994) (citing Bleistein and
noting that whether “parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair use”); Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bleistein); Mattel Inc. v. Walking
Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801–02 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying Bleistein); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc. 225 F.3d
1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Bleistein); Carol Barnhard Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411,
415 (2d Cir. 1985) (same).
21
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“[C]opyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public . . . it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.”).
22
See Raymond M. Polakovic, Should the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright Doghouse? Rethinking
Conceptual Separability, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 873 (1993) (asserting that the Copyright Act
requires courts to separate aesthetic and useful elements of a useful article); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright
Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 301 (1998) (“[T]he existence of copyright
makes subjective judicial pronouncements of aesthetic taste necessary.”); see also infra Part III.
23
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); see also infra Part III.
24
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (stating
that the Copyright Act permits “free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“[P]rotection is given only to the expression of
the idea—not the idea itself.”); see also infra Part III.
25
See, e.g., Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Walker v. Time Life Films, 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.
1986); see also infra Part III.
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genre. Similarly, whether two works are found to be “substantially similar”
depends, in large part, on the level of aesthetic specificity the court chooses
to apply to the work.26 Artistic intent is also frequently considered in
determining whether a use of copyright material is sufficiently
“transformative” to satisfy the “purpose and character” prong of the
statutory fair use test.27 Moreover, in some instances a judicial
determination of artistic merit and ontology is explicitly mandated by
statute.28
In sum, when faced with questions that require qualitative evaluation
of works of art, judges are forced to perform analytical jujitsu: first
blocking with citation to Bleistein, then attacking with an ad hoc aesthetic
theory of the court’s own devising.29
In performing this maneuver, some courts have focused solely on
comparing the configuration of elements in a work that provokes an
aesthetic reaction.30 This approach, known as Formalism,31 regards other
interpretative devices, such as accuracy in representation, expressiveness,
an artist’s professed intent, etc., as irrelevant. Formalism is perhaps best
epitomized in copyright law by Judge Learned Hand’s “comparative
method” of assessing musical works.32 In contrast, other courts have opted
26

Compare Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120–21 (2d Cir. 1930) (conducting a
detailed comparison of the plot and characters of two works), with Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding infringement on
the basis of general similarities between works). For an excellent discussion of issues of artistic
interpretation in the context of copyright infringement and the test of substantial similarity, see Yen,
supra note 22, at 288–97 (analyzing the interpretation of art by courts in the context of the ordinary
observer test).
27
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992); see also infra Part III. Compare Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301,
309–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that the unauthorized use of a photograph in the creation of a sculpture
was not parodic fair use), with Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding defendant’s
work sufficiently transformative to justify fair use defense). See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
28
See, e.g., Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (providing authors a right of
integrity that enables them to prevent the destruction of works of “recognized stature”); Brancusi v.
United States, T.D. 43063, 54 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 428, 428–29 (1928) (determining whether
Constantin Brancusi’s abstract sculpture Bird in Flight was a work of art or a mere “manufacture of
metal” for purpose of determining whether a customs duty was owed); Rev. Rul. 68-232, 1968-1 C.B.
79 (prohibiting depreciation deductions from federal income tax because art is not expected to
depreciate in value or become obsolete over time).
29
See, e.g., Polakovic, supra note 22, at 873.
30
See Yen, supra note 22, at 253 (“The key to defining art is the identification of the peculiar
qualities that enable certain objects, [but] not others, to provoke this ‘aesthetic emotion.’”). For a review
of some case law examples, see infra Part III.
31
See, e.g., CLIVE BELL, ART 17–18 (1958) (defining a formalist approach to art criticism).
32
Hand’s method involved a note-by-note comparison of the melodies of the musical works at
issue, pinpointing where identical pitches occurred at the same point in the two songs. For examples of
variations on this comparative method, see Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1946); Haas
v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); and Hein v. Harris, 175 F. 875, 876–77 (S.D.N.Y.
1910).
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for a diametrically opposed approach to aesthetic questions that foregoes
formal comparisons and instead focuses on the author’s intention at the
time she created the work.33 This aesthetic theory is commonly known as
Intentionalism.34 Still other courts have looked for aesthetic guidance based
on how a work is understood by “ideal readers” or an “intended
audience.”35 This approach is known as Reader-Response theory.36 And, as
often as not, courts end up doing theoretical mix and match,37 “swapping
one set of aesthetic premises for others in response to the facts of particular
cases.”38
Unfortunately, these three major aesthetic theories39 are largely
incompatible,40 and none are sufficiently expansive to cover the variety of
practices contained within a single artistic tradition, let alone the panoply
33

See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980)
(basing its finding of conceptual separability on evidence of plaintiff’s mental processes and the
reactions of others).
34
See, e.g., Monroe C. Beardsley, An Aesthetic Definition of Art, in WHAT IS ART? 15, 21 (1983)
(“[A]n artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic
interest.”); see also Yen, supra note 22, at 263–64; infra Part III.
35
See William E. Tolhurst, On What a Text Is and How It Means, 19 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 3, 11–13
(1979); infra Part III.
36
Reader-Response theory was developed as a mode of literary criticism. See, e.g., GEORGE
DICKIE, ART AND THE AESTHETIC: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 35–37 (1974) (arguing that an object
becomes art when it is presented to members of the art world for aesthetic consideration); LOIS TYSON,
CRITICAL THEORY TODAY: A USER-FRIENDLY GUIDE 154 (2014) (“[R]eader-response theorists share
two beliefs: (1) that the role of the reader cannot be omitted from our understanding of literature and (2)
that readers do not passively consume the meaning presented to them by an objective literary text;
rather they actively make the meaning they find in literature.”); see also Farley, supra note 9, at 844
(citing DICKIE, supra). For example, a Reader-Response critique of a putative artwork would assess
whether or not members of the “art world” perceive and value the work as art. See Arthur Danto, The
Artworld, 61 J. PHIL. 571, 581 (1964) (discussing “ready-mades” and the work of Andy Warhol).
37
Compare Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 990 (holding based on Intentionalism and
Institutionalism), with Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985)
(analysis based on Formalism).
38
Yen, supra note 22, at 298.
39
The philosophical tradition of aesthetics dates back at least to Greek antiquity. See, e.g.,
ARISTOTLE, POETICS (Joe Sachs trans., 2006); David Sider, Plato’s Early Aesthetics: The Hippas
Major, 35 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 465 (1977). A full survey of the subject is well beyond the
scope of this Article. For a general survey, see MARCIA MUELDER EATON, BASIC ISSUES IN
AESTHETICS (Waveland Press 1999) (1987).
40
As Part III, infra, illustrates, courts combine the three aesthetic theories in their assessment of
legal issue. In addition to leading to inconsistent outcomes in the case law, it should be noted that these
different approaches are incompatible from the standpoint of aesthetic theory: Formalism explicitly
rejects the author’s intent as irrelevant to a work (i.e., the “intentional fallacy”), and Intentionalism
concerns itself with formal properties or the work to see if the artist achieved their intended goal (i.e.,
“She said she was doing X, but the song actually conveys Y.”). Reader-Response theory is more
flexible insofar as it can go either way, so in that sense it is not entirely incompatible with either
Formalism or Intentionalism except that it supplants the authority of both theories as the theory of art
(i.e., the audience can respond however it wants, and there is not one single “correct” reading of the
work).
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of mediums protected by copyright law. As a result, doctrinal
inconsistencies abound (both inter- and intra-circuit),41 and the case law
largely fails to provide clear guidance as to the scope of protection—and
risk of liability—associated with different ways of making art.
Therefore, to alleviate this confusion, courts need to jettison the
doctrine of avoidance42 and explicitly acknowledge the necessity of
aesthetic interpretation in copyright adjudication.43 This Article argues that
courts should instead adopt a framework for making aesthetic
determinations based upon a “Community of Practice” standard, roughly
analogous to the “person having ordinary skill in the art” standard utilized
in patent law.44 The proposed standard would help resolve the confusion
that so often arises when art is hauled into a courtroom. First, our proposal
will help allay courts’ fears concerning aesthetic determinations by
providing a methodology for systematically sifting through art’s historical
and theoretical literature and obtaining input from experts. Second, our
Community of Practice standard will enable litigants to settle many
aesthetic questions ex ante, which would facilitate bargaining and
extrajudicial dispute resolution. Third, our proposal will promote artistic
innovation by establishing clearer guidelines for artists, promoting artistic
production, and potentially reducing incidents of copyright infringement.45
Part I of this Article details the various aesthetic theories that courts
have used to make judgments, and analyzes the relative merits of each
aesthetic approach. Part II discusses specific instances in which aesthetic
judgments are required by copyright doctrine. Finally, Part III describes the
proposed Community of Practice standard in detail and posits its
superiority to any single aesthetic theory described in Part I.
I.

AESTHETIC THEORY AND COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE

Aesthetic theory is the branch of philosophy concerned with the
interpretation and meaning of art.46 At its core, aesthetics posits two basic
questions: “What is art?” and “How should it be interpreted?” The former
question, though important to a wide range of statutory provisions and
41

See Yen, supra note 22, at 274–84 (discussing the oscillation aesthetic theories used by the
Second Circuit in determining cases involving useful articles).
42
See Farley, supra note 9, at 815.
43
This Article is concerned primarily with the role of aesthetic interpretation in copyright law. For
a discussion of the legal significance of designating a work as “art” in other fields of law, see id. at
819–37.
44
See infra Part III; see also 35 U.S.C. § 103(A) (2012).
45
See infra Part IV.
46
See generally AESTHETICS: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (George Dickie et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989);
ARGUING ABOUT ART (Alex Neill & Aaron Ridley eds., 3d ed. 2008). The term “aesthetics” is also
used to denote theories of the beautiful, which are beyond the scope of the use of the term here. See,
e.g., ARTHUR C. DANTO, THE ABUSE OF BEAUTY: AESTHETICS AND THE CONCEPT OF ART 1 (2003).
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common law principles,47 has little bearing on copyright law generally.48
However, the question of how art should be interpreted is very important to
copyright jurisprudence, as discussed in Part III.49 In this Part, we will
assess three major theories of artistic interpretation—Formalism,
Intentionalism, and Reader-Response50—that have been used extensively,
albeit covertly, by courts.51
A. Bleistein and the “Doctrine of Avoidance”
In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the Court determined
whether chromolithographs—an early form of color photographs52—that
had been created for use as commercial advertisements were protected as
“pictorial illustrations” under copyright law.53 The respondents contended
that works only qualified as “pictorial illustrations” if they were “connected
with the fine arts.”54 The Court squarely rejected this argument, holding
that the chromolithographs in question were pictorial illustrations protected
by copyright.55 But then Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, went on to
say:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke. . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to

47

See, e.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding a statutory requirement that funding
from the National Endowment for the Arts must take into “consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” when determining artistic merit
and excellence for the purposes of grant-making); see also supra note 28.
48
This is true with the notable exception of the Visual Artists Rights Act, which provides
additional moral rights to works of art of “recognized stature.” See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012).
49
See infra Part III.
50
Reader-Response is also known in the visual arts context as Institutionalism (with some
variations). See DICKIE, supra note 36, at 35–37.
51
See Yen, supra note 22, at 252–66 (discussing major theories in aesthetics that have been utilized
by courts).
52
See Planographic Printing, N.Y. PUB. LIBRARY (2001), http://seeing.nypl.org/planographic.html
[http://perma.cc/8PTF-7XHK].
53
188 U.S. 239, 248, 251 (1903) (holding that commercial illustrations were “art” for the purpose
of copyright protection); see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STORIES 77, 77–108 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
54
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (citing Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 3, 18 Stat. 78, 79).
55
Id.
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say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any
public is not to be treated with contempt.56

On first impression, this passage seems commonsensical: it is not the
business of courts to instruct people what art to appreciate. True enough,
perhaps, but then courts are rarely (if ever) asked to settle disputes over
aesthetic preferences––i.e., to be “final judges of the worth” of a putative
artwork.57 Rather, the question that courts face is more fundamental: is the
work in dispute art or something else?58 And if it is art, how should it be
interpreted and compared to other artworks?59 On these issues, Bleistein’s
prescription is less cogent.
First, the “dangerous undertaking” that Holmes warned of occurs
because “persons trained only to the law” seek to make final judgments on
the worth of artwork.60 By negative implication, this would suggest that
judges trained in art history or aesthetics might be qualified to make such
judgments.61 And even if a judge is completely ignorant of art, it might still
be permissible for her to make aesthetic judgments if they are within the
“narrowest and most obvious limits.”62 What these limits are, Justice
Holmes did not say, nor has any subsequent court.
Second, Holmes argued that judges should avoid aesthetic
pronouncements because the potential for “commercial,” “aesthetic,” and
“educational” values implicit in a work might escape the court’s attention.63
“[I]f they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial
value—it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt.”64 Justice Holmes’s concern for the aesthetic preferences of
persons “less educated than the judge” is admirable.65 However, the link
between aesthetic, educational, and commercial value is tenuous. Even if
the Bleistein Court had accepted the respondent’s argument that only works
“connected with the fine arts” qualified for copyright protection,66 it doesn’t
56

Id. at 251–52.
Id.
58
See supra note 28.
59
See supra note 28; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52.
61
Justice Holmes himself was qualified to make such judgments, evident from references in the
Bleistein decision to Velázquez, Whistler, Rembrandt, Müller, Degas, Manet, and Goya, as well as the
art historian John Ruskin. See id. at 249–52; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Notes on Albrecht
Dürer, in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 153 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995)
(presenting an essay about artist Albrecht Dürer written by Justice Holmes). Other judges have proven
themselves similarly competent to discuss art and art history. See supra note 6.
62
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251–52.
63
Id. at 252.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 250 (citing Act of June 18, 1874, ch. 301, § 3, 18 Stat. 78, 79).
57
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necessarily follow that these works also have commercial, educational, or
aesthetic value. A visit to the dumpster behind an art school would provide
ample evidence of putatively worthless “fine art.”
Finally, and most problematically, the types of aesthetic judgment that
Justice Holmes cautioned against were simply not at issue in Bleistein. The
Court had not been asked to define “fine arts” or even to construe the
meaning of “connected with the fine arts.”67 Rather, the Court was tasked
with determining whether advertisements are “pictorial illustrations” within
the meaning of the copyright statute.68 On this question, Holmes maintained
that aesthetic merits do not matter:
[T]he act however construed, does not mean that ordinary posters are not good
enough to be considered within its scope. The antithesis to “illustrations or
works connected with the fine arts” is not works of little merit or of humble
degree, or illustrations addressed to the less educated classes; it is “prints or
labels designed to be used for any other articles of manufacture.”69

As such, Bleistein’s warnings against aesthetic judgments should properly
be read as dicta; Bleistein does not explicitly hold that courts must abstain
from aesthetic judgments in all instances.70 Nonetheless, subsequent courts
have cited Bleistein as requiring such abstention.71
As scholars have noted, courts provide numerous reasons for avoiding
aesthetic determinations under the so-called doctrine of avoidance.72 Courts
have argued that aesthetics are inherently subjective and dependent on
taste, which is outside the realm of what courts may properly decide.73
Similarly, the principle of judicial neutrality has been evoked to forbid
aesthetic decisionmaking,74 which would elevate particular aesthetic
preferences and theories over other equally valid ideas.75 Other courts have

67

Id.
Id.
69
Id. at 251.
70
For example, Bleistein itself contemplates that judges will make aesthetic determinations within
the “narrowest and most obvious limits.” Id. at 251; see Farley, supra note 9, at 818.
71
See Farley, supra note 9, at 816 n.36. For a partial list of cases citing Bleistein, see supra note
20.
72
See Farley, supra note 9, at 813–19 (coining the phrase “doctrine of avoidance” and enumerating
some of the reasons why courts avoid aesthetic determinations).
73
See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (“[W]hat is contemptuous to one . . . may
be a work of art to another.”); see also Farley, supra note 9, at 812 n.15 (providing a list of case
citations discussing subjectivity and art).
74
See Farley, supra note 9, at 811 & n.14 (listing courts and commentators who have argued that
law and aesthetics should not be intermingled).
75
See id. at 813 (citing Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 n.3
(2d Cir. 1987)).
68
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pled incompetence in artistic assessment76 or have expressed concern that
revealing their views on art would result in being labeled philistines, or
worse.77
Courts have pursued various strategies to implement the doctrine of
avoidance,78 such as substituting other issues in place of the aesthetic
question,79 focusing on the weight of evidence rather than its meaning,80 or
simply concluding without supporting analysis.81 However, none of these
avoidance techniques eliminate aesthetic questions from the judicial
inquiry: they merely shift such questions to the side, out of focus. This
results in an incomplete snapshot of the law, leaving out the numerous
areas of copyright law that explicitly require artistic judgment.82 In these
areas, a different mode of reasoning cannot substitute for actual artistic
interpretation.83 As a result, the doctrine of avoidance—intended to
promote objectivity and eliminate questions of taste—ironically creates a
dynamic where courts must rely solely on their own subjective intuitions
and apply them in an ad hoc fashion.
B. Brief Survey of Aesthetic Theories Used in Copyright
Sometimes covertly, often unconsciously, courts have drawn on
artistic theory and practice for resolution of aesthetic questions. This
Section offers a brief summary of some of three major theories of aesthetic
interpretation often used by courts.84

76

See, e.g., Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003); Martin v.
City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1999); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254
(D. Minn. 1980); see also Farley, supra note 9, at 814.
77
See Farley, supra note 9, at 815 (“[E]ven culturally elite judges fear the exposure that can be
caused by laying bare their views on art.” (citing Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir.
1983))); cf. HILTON KRAMER, THE REVENGE OF THE PHILISTINES: ART AND CULTURE, 1972–1984, at
382–83 (1985) (“[W]hereas Pop art had shocked its initial public with a show of campy humor and
facetious charm[,] . . . the new expressionism looked to be in dead earnest.”).
78
See Farley, supra note 9, at 836–39 (discussing different analytical maneuvers used by courts to
avoid aesthetic questions).
79
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (exhibiting how the circuit court
avoided the pertinent question of whether appropriation art constitutes fair use by focusing instead on
legal requirements for parody).
80
See, e.g., Martin, 192 F.3d at 612–14 (concluding that a sculpture was of “recognized stature”
based upon volume of documents regarding the work, rather than what the documents said about the
sculpture’s artistic status).
81
See, e.g., Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305 (“True, the background in Miss Gracen’s painting differs from
that in Figure 2, but it is drawn from the movie set. We do not consider a picture created by
superimposing one copyrighted photographic image on another to be ‘original’ . . . .”).
82
See infra Part III.
83
See Yen, supra note 22, at 301; Polakovic, supra note 22, at 873; see also infra Part III
(discussing specific areas where aesthetic judgment is required in copyright law).
84
As Professor Alfred C. Yen has observed, the “analytical premises of copyright opinions are
practically identical to those of major aesthetic theories.” Yen, supra note 22, at 250.
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1. Objective Meanings of a Work: Formalism.—Formalist theory
defines art based on the “peculiar qualities that enable certain objects, [but]
not others, to provoke . . . aesthetic emotion.”85 Following this theory, a
good artwork arouses an emotional experience in a sensitive observer
through the interrelationship of its formal qualities—line, shape, color,
etc.86 For a Formalist, aesthetic sensation is derived solely from a work’s
configuration.87 Neither the artist’s state of mind at the work’s creation, nor
the subject matter contained in the work, is relevant to its status as art.88
Knowledge of the artist’s ideas or biography may even be detrimental to a
proper understanding of an artwork because these details might distract a
viewer from fully appreciating a work’s form.89
If the meaning of a work is intrinsic to the work itself, then a viewer
can discern this meaning through empirical inquiry without recourse to
personal views.90 Thus, a single, objective, “correct” interpretation of the
work is theoretically possible.91 Moreover, because the focus in Formalist
interpretation is solely based on the qualities of a work that are
aesthetically moving (e.g., shapes that are pleasing, sounds that are
harmonious), and knowledge of the artist’s life or work is not required,92
some theorists have maintained that a lay observer is capable of making
aesthetic judgments equal to those of an expert. In this way, Formalism
seems to provide an elegant solution to the problem of subjectivity and
taste: art is not just in the eye of the beholder. For this reason, among
others,93 Formalism is a favorite go-to position for courts.94

85

Yen, supra note 22, at 253; see also BELL, supra note 31, at 17; HAROLD ROSENBERG, THE DEDEFINITION OF ART 11 (1972).
86
Farley, supra note 9, at 842; see also JOHN ANDREW FISHER, REFLECTING ON ART 250–55, 262
(1993).
87
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 31, at 27–28 (“[T]o appreciate a work of art we need bring with us
nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions. Art transports
us from the world of man’s activity to a world of aesthetic exultation.”); see also Yen, supra note 22, at
261–62.
88
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 31, at 19 (“In pure aesthetics we have only to consider our emotion
and its object: for the purposes of aesthetics we have no right, neither is there any necessity, to pry
behind the object into the state of mind of him who made it.”).
89
See W.K. Wimsatt & M.C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, 54 SEWANEE REV. 468, 487
(1946) (“Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle.”).
90
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 31, at 27–28 (“For a moment we are shut off from human interests;
our anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life. . . . In this world the
emotions of life find no place. It is a world with emotions of its own.”).
91
See Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 89, at 469 (“A poem can be only through its meanings—
since its medium is words—yet it is, simply is, in the sense that we have no excuse of inquiring what
part is intended or meant.”).
92
See BELL, supra note 31, at 19.
93
For example, Formalism is considered more commonsensical and instinctual than other aesthetic
theories. See Yen, supra note 22, at 262 (“[F]ormalist theories of interpretation bear a rough
resemblance to the interpretive approach that many laypersons might take.”).
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However, Formalism has serious interpretative weaknesses and blind
spots. For example, consider the following sentence: “Half the people you
know are below average.” Should this be interpreted as a statement of fact,
or a humorous quip? Does it help to know that the phrase is popularly
attributed to comedian Steven Wright?95 The true meaning of the statement
cannot be derived through the Formalist method because the source of the
statement is not contained in the text. A reader–listener would have to
know the sentence was written by a comedian in order to grasp its full
meaning.96 Similarly, Formalism utterly fails to account for many
movements in modern and contemporary art that emphasize the conceptual
and referential content of a work over its physical qualities.97
2. The Author’s State of Mind: Intentionalism.—Whereas Formalism
regards authorial intent as irrelevant to a work’s meaning,98 Intentionalism
holds that artists’ creative motivations are paramount to understanding their
art.99 According to this theory, “[A]n artwork is something produced with
the intention of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest.”100
Under this definition, for a work to be considered art it must have arisen
from an artist’s volition: accidental acts of beauty are not art.101 As such, an
objective interpretation of a work of art can only be derived from inquiry
into the state of mind of the artist at the moment of creation.102 For
example, an Intentionalist reading of “half the people you know are below
average,” could identify that the sentence was meant as a joke, on the basis
that the writer was a comedian and the sentence was uttered as part of a
stand-up routine.

94

See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (applying a formalist approach to
compare two songs); see also infra Part III.
95
See The Mind of Steven Wright . . . , ENGL. TCHRS. NETWORK ISRAEL (1997), http://www.
etni.org.il/farside/mindgames.htm [http://perma.cc/6LT3-JTL4].
96
See, e.g., Tolhurst, supra note 35, at 3–14 (discussing a similar example: “Nixon is the best
president since Lincoln”); see also Yen supra note 22, at 262.
97
For example, Dada, Minimalism, Process Art, Performance Art, Conceptual Art, and
Appropriation Art all deemphasize the making of aesthetically pleasing objects in favor of presenting
“art as an idea.” See generally JONATHAN FINEBERG, ART SINCE 1940: STRATEGIES OF BEING 14–17
(1995); LUCY LIPPARD, SIX YEARS: THE DEMATERIALIZATION OF THE ART OBJECT (1973); IRVING
SANDLER, ART OF THE POSTMODERN ERA: FROM THE LATE 1960S TO THE EARLY 1990S, at 332–74
(1996).
98
See, e.g., supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
99
See, e.g., Beardsley, supra note 34, at 21; see also Farley, supra note 9, at 843 (explaining that
Intentionalism calls for observers to have “some insights into the creative mind of the artist” to properly
evaluate the object itself).
100
Beardsley, supra note 34, at 21.
101
Id. at 28.
102
See generally E. D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF INTERPRETATION (1976) (defending
Intentionalism).
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However, as one leading Intentionalist readily concedes: “[I]ntentions,
being private, are difficult to know.”103 Evidence of an artist’s intentions is
frequently missing or uncertain (as is often the case when the artist is
deceased),104 or an artist may simply be inarticulate.105 More worrisome
still, even unambiguous statements of intent may be self-serving and
erroneous.106 For example, an author may claim to have had a conscious
intention that was not actually present at the time of creation.107 Such
uncertainty presents particular risks in litigation, where artists have a strong
motivation to represent their intentions in the light most favorable to their
legal position.
3. The Audience’s Mind: Reader-Response Theory.—In response to
the interpretative weaknesses of both Formalism and Intentionalism, some
aesthetic theorists have posited that the meaning of a work of art is only
what exists in the minds of its audience, a theory known as ReaderResponse.108 The most extreme version of this theory holds that works of
art never have a fixed or universally accepted meaning.109 Because no two
readers share the same set of aesthetic assumptions, there can be no
103

Beardsley, supra note 34, at 23.
The process of identifying an artist’s intent through extrinsic evidence is roughly analogous to
the determination of a perpetrator’s mens rea at the time of their crime.
105
For example, Abstract Expressionist painter Jackson Pollock was famous for his inability to talk
about his own work. See, e.g., Maria Popova, Jackson Pollock on Art, Labels, and Morality, Shortly
Before His Death, BRAIN PICKINGS, http://www.brainpickings.org/index.php/2013/04/09/jacksonpollock-selden-rodman-conversations-with-artists/ [http://perma.cc/C2MH-2SX5] (“[Pollock] talks with
difficulty, searching painfully, almost agonizingly, for the right word, with constant apologies ‘for not
being verbal.’” (quoting SELDON RODMAN, CONVERSATIONS WITH ARTISTS 81 (1957))).
106
See, e.g., JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH, EDGAR ALLEN POE: A STUDY IN GENIUS 98 (1926) (disputing
the methods Poe claimed to have used in writing The Philosophy of Composition, calling them instead:
“[A] highly ingenious exercise in the art of rationalization [rather] than literary criticism . . . .”); see
also Yen, supra note 22, at 263–64 (“[E]vidence of an author’s intention is often missing or unclear.”).
107
Take, for example, Krzysztof Penderecki’s musical composition Threnody for the Victims of
Hiroshima. This piece was originally titled 8'37 (likely an homage to John Cage’s musical composition
titled 4'33"), but it was retitled to reference the destruction of Hiroshima after listeners noted
similarities to the sound of bombs dropping and people screaming. See Threnody to the Victims of
Hiroshima – Krzysztof Penderecki, CULTURE.PL (Apr. 30, 2014), http://culture.pl/en/work/threnody-tothe-victims-of-hiroshima-krzysztof-penderecki [http://perma.cc/VS5-PQKA?type=live]. Therefore,
whatever associations the listeners might draw between the piece and the bombing of Hiroshima cannot
be credited to the composer’s intentions.
108
See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Who Cares Who Wrote “Shakespeare”?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 617, 619–20
(1988) (“[T]he object of critical attention is the structure of the reader’s experience, not any ‘objective’
structure to be found in the work itself.” (quoting TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 85 (1983))). See generally Jane P. Tompkins, An Introduction to Reader-Response
Criticism, in READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM, at ix (Jane
P. Tompkins, ed., 1980).
109
See Tompkins, supra note 108, at xix–xx (discussing the theories of Norman Holland, wherein
“interpretation is a function of identity,” and David Bleich, wherein “meaning depends entirely on the
process of symbolization that takes place in the mind of the reader”).
104
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consensus as to the “correct” meaning of a work, and interpretation is a
mere function of the reader’s preferences.110 Thus, all aesthetic
disagreements are unresolvable matters of personal taste.111
Other Reader-Response theorists, however, contend that such
relativism can be avoided if one presupposes that some readers are more
accurate than others. For instance, an Elizabethan scholar’s interpretation
of the text of Julius Caesar is likely to be more accurate than a seventhgrader’s. From this, one can imagine a hypothetical “ideal reader” or
“intended audience” capable of supplying the most plausible (if never
precisely correct) interpretation of a work.112
Unfortunately, in practice, Reader-Response theory can often morph
into an ersatz form of either Formalism113 or Intentionalism.114 For example,
if the best interpretation of a work is derived from its reception by the
author’s “intended audience,” then this hypothetical audience is likely to
hold values and beliefs that are very close (if not identical) to the persons
that the author intended to communicate with in the first place.115 Thus, the
artist’s intentions largely control the composition of the “intended
audience,” causing analysis of the audience’s response to yield a result
similar to Intentionalism.116 Furthermore, Reader-Response theory holds
within it the potential danger of discrimination against minority viewpoints,
depending on how one defines a work’s “ideal reader.” For example, if
preference is given to the aesthetic understanding of members of the
putative “art world,” then the viewpoints of people who are not members of
that world are necessarily excluded. This excluded group would contain
110

See id.
This aesthetic position goes back at least as far as the Romans, who had an expression: de
gustibus non disputandum est (“there is no disputing of tastes”). See Jesse Prinz, Really Bad Taste, in
KNOWING ART: ESSAYS IN AESTHETICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 95 (Matthew Kieran & Dominic Mciver
Lopes eds., 2007).
112
See JONATHAN CULLER, STRUCTURALIST POETICS: STRUCTURALISM, LINGUISTICS AND THE
STUDY OF LITERATURE 123–24 (1975); Yen, supra note 22, at 265–66 (“The trick to a correct
interpretation . . . becomes the selection of a particular reader whose perspective is elevated above
others.”); Tolhurst, supra note 35, at 12. Given the rough equivalence between the hypothetical reader
offered by Reader-Response theory and the well-established legal fiction of the “reasonable person,” it
would seem that this theory offers the best interpretative fit for courts. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (providing a test for determining the decisionmaking
process of a hypothetical reasonable person); see also infra Part III.
113
See CULLER, supra note 112, at 123–24. However, the risk of Reader-Response theory
devolving into Formalism is not as great as the risk that it might turn into Intentionalism. See Yen,
supra note 22, at 265–66.
114
See, e.g., Tolhurst, supra note 35, at 11 (arguing that the correct meaning of a text is best
understood as the “intention which a member of the intended audience would be most justified in
attributing to the author based on the knowledge and attitudes which he possess by virtue of being a
member of the intended audience”).
115
See Yen, supra note 22, at 266.
116
See id.
111

357

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

many artists and art practices that have not garnered significant commercial
or scholarly recognition, such as “outsider artists.”117
*

*

*

This brief introduction provides a general framework for thinking
about the fault lines in artistic interpretation and the challenges presented to
courts in thinking through aesthetic issues in a systematically consistent
way.118 Though it may be true that “[n]o one can say with assurance what a
work of art is,”119 this bare fact should not dissuade courts from engaging
with aesthetic thought anymore than they should avoid similarly
indeterminate areas of knowledge such as economics, psychology, and
religion.120 Moreover, as we will see in the next Part, copyright law
demands that courts make aesthetic determinations, and rendering such
judgments without acknowledgment of aesthetic theory has led to doctrinal
confusion. Thus, because courts cannot avoid making artistic judgments,121
they need to be cognizant of the theoretical underpinnings of these
judgments, elusive though they may be.
II. SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS IN
COPYRIGHT CASE LAW
In this Part, we provide an overview of instances in which copyright
doctrine requires artistic evaluations. We also identify instances where
courts use arguments that closely mirror aesthetic theories. Formalism,
Intentionalism, and Reader-Response theories are all utilized, albeit
implicitly, in judicial decisions on a wide range of issues in copyright law,
including eligibility, originality, authorship, infringement, and fair use.122
A. The Province of Copyright Law: Works by “Authors”
The Copyright Act provides that a fundamental requirement for
copyright protection is that a work must be an “original work[] of
117

See generally COLIN RHODES, OUTSIDER ART: SPONTANEOUS ALTERNATIVES (2000)
(discussing works created by artists on the margins of the art world and society, such as psychiatric
patients, criminals, recluses, etc.); PARALLEL VISIONS: MODERN ARTISTS AND OUTSIDER ART (Maurice
Tuchman & Carol Eliel eds., 1992) (discussing the same).
118
Our discussion of aesthetic theory is not comprehensive, either in the breadth of the models
presented or their conceptual depth. For a more in-depth treatment of these philosophies, see generally
THEODOR W. ADORNO, AESTHETIC THEORY (1997); DANTO, supra note 46; and TERRY EAGLETON,
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE AESTHETIC (1990).
119
ROSENBERG, supra note 85, at 12.
120
See supra notes 1–4.
121
See infra Part III.
122
See Farley, supra note 9, at 845–49 (“[C]ourts are not self-conscious or explicit about the
theories of art they are employing. . . . Their invocation of these theories is intuitive, not deliberate.”).
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authorship,”123 but the Act neither defines “authorship” nor “originality.”124
Courts have struggled with the meaning of these terms, in no small part
because defining them requires an implicit inquiry into the creative process.
For instance, on the one hand, the standard of “originality” is relatively
low. It does not require novelty, ingenuity, or any particular benchmark of
artistic merit. On the other hand, however, an “original work of authorship”
implies some “authorial” presence. A work must be “independently created
by authors” and involve some minimal “creative spark.”125 In the words of
Benjamin Kaplan, “[T]o make the copyright turnstile revolve, the author
should have to deposit more than a penny in the box . . . .”126 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court clarified in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., the mere investment of time and industrious labor (i.e., “sweat
of the brow”) does not justify copyright protection.127 The historical
evolution of this originality standard illustrates how issues of aesthetic
determination loom large in disputes where the protectability of a work is
at issue.128
For instance, in expanding copyright protection to photographs in
1884, the Supreme Court distinguished photographs that are the “original
123

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act’s explicit reference, courts have
traditionally read an originality requirement implicit in the copyright statute. See JULIE E. COHEN ET
AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 57–58 (2010). Countries around the world
employ various standards of copyright eligibility. Italy, France, and several other European countries
require that a work is the “personal expression of [the] author.” Herman Cohen Jehoram, The EC
Copyright Directives, Economic and Authors’ Rights, 25 INT’L REV. IND. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 821,
828–29 (1994). Japan has a stringent originality requirement that “thoughts or sentiments are expressed
in a creative way” so to “fall within the literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain.” Michael J.
Bastian, Protection of “Noncreative” Databases: Harmonization of United States, Foreign and
International Law, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 425, 433 (1999).
124
See § 101.
125
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court emphasized that
originality implies that a work is “independently created by authors (as opposed to copied from other
works).” 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). Still, the Supreme Court maintained the long-standing judicial
standard that “some creative spark” is required for a work to be eligible for copyright protection: “There
remains a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be
virtually nonexistent. Such works are incapable of sustaining a valid copyright.” Id. at 345, 359 (citation
omitted) (holding that telephone white pages directory lacked the minimal originality to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of originality).
126
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (Columbia University Press 1967),
reprinted in BENJAMIN KAPLAN ET AL., AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT REPUBLISHED (AND
WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) 46 (Iris C. Geik et al. eds., 2005).
127
499 U.S. at 349 (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
‘to [p]romote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))); see also
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990).
128
For a description of the history of originality in copyright law, see Dale P. Olson, Thin
Copyrights, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 147 (1992) (focusing on copyright in compilations and the rejection of
“sweat of the brow” and “industrious compilation” to the Feist standard of originality).
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mental conception” and “intellectual invention” of the photographer from
unprotected photographs that consist of a “mere mechanical reproduction
of the physical features or outlines of some object.”129 Although even
“crude, humble or obvious” contributions to the arts are eligible for
protection, “some creative spark” is nevertheless required.130 In BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Supreme Court held that a
photograph of Oscar Wilde was protected, noting its qualities as a
useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff
made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental conception, to which
he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera,
selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories
in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation,
made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.131

Two different aesthetic theories animated the Court’s decision. First, in
order to assess whether the work was sufficiently creative, the Court turned
to the work’s physical form when it described the photograph as “useful,
new, harmonious, characteristic and graceful.”132 Second, the reference to
the author’s creative “selection and arrangement” of the photograph
“implies that originality depends on the operation of a putative author’s
mind, and not the features of the work itself.”133 The Burrow-Giles
precedent set courts on the path of both Formalistic and Intentionalist
interpretations of creative works.
For instance, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, the Second
Circuit faced the difficult question of whether mezzotint reproductions of
classic works could receive copyright protection.134 The goal of the author
of such prints may have been to create an exact replica of the original, but
the process of mezzotint engraving necessarily created variations between
the original and the reproduced versions. The court ignored the intent of the
129

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884) (finding creative
decisions in the selection and arrangement of clothing, lighting, and the subject made a photograph of
Oscar Wilde an original work); see also Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir.
2000) (“It is well recognized that photography is a form of artistic expression, requiring numerous
artistic judgments.”); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Elements of originality in a
photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the
desired expression, and almost any other variant involved.”); E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec.
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“There is a very broad scope for copyright in
photographs, encompassing almost any photograph that reflects more than ‘slavish copying.’”).
130
499 U.S. at 345.
131
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
132
Id.
133
See Yen, supra note 22, at 268.
134
191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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alleged author in favor of an analysis of the physical form of the plaintiff’s
work—a classic example of a court deploying aesthetic Formalism. The
court held that any “distinguishable” variation between the original and
subsequent work is sufficient to support a copyright.135 Discerning a
“distinguishable” variation in a work requires aesthetic interpretation
squarely at odds with the doctrine of avoidance.136
It is also important to note that decisions about creativity and
originality are not presented to courts as simple, binary yes–no questions.
Copyright disputes often compel courts to assess the degree of creativity in
a work. Even if a work is considered original enough to receive protection,
the amount of creativity involved affects the scope of protection afforded
the work. Copyright law provides less protection (i.e., “thin copyright”) to
works that involve only modest levels of originality, as opposed to “thick
copyright” for more creative works.137 In general, if a work displays only
minimal creativity, then only slavish copying or virtually identical
reproductions will infringe on the copyright of the work.138 As a result,
courts must distinguish between works that require less creativity to
produce and those on a higher creative plane.139 In other words, it is not
sufficient for courts to merely identify an artistic contribution; judges must

135

Id. at 105 (“A copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of
thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations.”).
136
Courts would adapt a hybrid version of Formalist and Intentionalist analyses. For a discussion
of originality in reproductions, see infra, Part III.B.
137
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“[T]he copyright in a
factual compilation [involving a minimal degree of creativity] is thin.”).
138
As Judge Learned Hand observed: “[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can be
copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly.” Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see, e.g., Apple Computer v. Microsoft
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that because the similarities in two software programs
came from basic ideas and their obvious expressions, the works as a whole would have to be virtually
identical for infringement to have occurred); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Systems, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding thin copyright when there are only limited ways to express
an idea); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606–07 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting that “mere identity of ideas” in two works is insufficient to give rise to infringement); see also
David E. Shipley, Thin but Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact
Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. 91 (2007) (discussing Feist and the limits of copyright as applied to fact
intensive works).
139
Based on the writings by Ginsburg and Gorman, it has been suggested that copyright
infringement cases involve the distinction between “high-authorship” works, displaying “the individual
personality of the author, through expression of emotion, imagination, and artistic creativity,” and “lowauthorship” works, those with “rich . . . ideas, facts, and/or useful information.” Ronald B. Standler,
Copyright Protection for Nonfiction or Compilations of Facts in the USA 5 (Apr. 20, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (available at http://www.rbs2.com/cfact.pdf [http://perma.cc/LMC9-XZMZ])
(referencing Ginsburg, supra note 127, at 1873–93, and Robert Gorman, Copyright Protection for the
Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1963)). Within these groups, the
degree of creativity also likely affects the scope of protection against infringement.
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also discern and distinguish between various levels of creativity, thereby
implicating aesthetic theory.140
B. A “Spark of Originality” in Derivative Works
When a creator has reproduced a work that is in the public domain, an
aesthetic evaluation of the “creative” differences between the original work
and the reproduction is required.141 Courts must distinguish between trivial
or mechanical variations and variations that have a “spark of originality”142
or that are “recognizably” that of the author.143
For example, in Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, the court granted
copyright protection to a replica of the public domain Hand of God
sculpture by Rodin.144 In doing so, the court praised the “precise, artistic”
qualities of the reproduction, and commended the “skill and originality”
involved, paying close attention to formal aspects of the derivative work:
It is undisputed that the original sculpture owned by the Carnegie Institute
is 37 inches and that plaintiff’s copyrighted work is 18½ inches.
The originality and distinction between the plaintiff’s work and the original
also lies in the treatment of the rear side of the base. The rear side of the
original base is open; that of the plaintiff’s work is closed. We find that this
difference when coupled with the skilled scaled sculpture is itself creative.145

Similarly, in denying copyright protection to plastic novelty bank in the
shape of Uncle Sam, a character in the public domain, the Second Circuit in
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder stated that reproductions of works in the
public domain must demonstrate a degree of “true artistic skill” that
extends beyond physical skills or training, such that the artist creates a
“substantial variation” of the original work.146 In analyzing the various
differences between the original public domain work and the work seeking

140

See infra Part II.B.
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (setting a
“distinguishable variation” standard to assess whether the author of the derivative work has made an
independent contribution).
142
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. V. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating
that copyright is not available for “slavish” photographic copies of classic paintings).
143
Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 (stating that mezzotint engravings of paintings sufficiently depart
from underlying works to qualify for copyright protection).
144
177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
145
Id. at 267.
146
536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc). With regard to variations on copyrighted works, see
Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (introducing a two-part test to assess
copyright claim on a derivative work by a third party who does not hold the copyright on the underlying
original work); Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir.
1997) (stating that to support a copyright claim, variations between original and derivate work must be
more than trivial).
141
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protection, the court reviewed in detail the formal differences between both
works:
Similarities include, more importantly, the appearance and number of stripes
on the trousers, buttons on the coat, and stars on the vest and hat, the attire and
pose of Uncle Sam, the decor on his base and bag, the overall color scheme,
the method of carpetbag opening, to name but a few.147

Yet, unlike in Alva, the court also considered art historical conditions
surrounding the original work. The Batlin court noted that the Uncle Sam
Bank did not belong in a “category of substantial originality,” and was not
the “creativity in the underlying work of art of the same order of magnitude
as in the case of the ‘Hand of God.’”148 Rodin’s sculpture is also largely
inaccessible to the general public so a significant public benefit accrues
from its precise, artistic reproduction.149 “No such benefit [was] imagined
to accrue . . . from the ‘knock-off’ reproduction of the cast iron Uncle Sam
bank.”150
To some degree, issues of distinguishable variation emerge in all areas
of the creative arts. For instance, in the context of realistic photographs of
existing works, photos will receive copyright protection as derivative
works only if the photographer has “recast, transformed, or adapted”151 the
original work in an original manner that cannot be deemed trivial.152 Here
as well, the degree of creativity in the original work being photographed
may factor into how much, if any, copyright protection is granted to a
derivative work.153
C. Useful or Expressive Works
Whenever a creative work also has utilitarian features, copyright law
must assess the overall character of the work to determine whether it is

147

Batlin, 536 F.2d at 489.
Id. at 492.
149
Id.; cf. Alva Studios, 177 F. Supp. at 267 (explaining the artistic merit involved in the creation of
a scaled down replica of Rodin’s Hand of God).
150
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 492.
151
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
152
Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 522 (7th Cir. 2009) (granting copyright on
pictures of toys for promotional materials because the photographs possessed sufficient incremental
original expression); SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (granting thin copyright protection on the “totality of the precise lighting selection, angle of the
camera, lens and filter selection” for photographs of mirrored picture frames for promotional materials).
153
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000) (in determining issue of
copyrightability and infringement of photographs of bottle, the court analyzed the creativity of the
original work that was being photographed: “The Skyy vodka bottle, although attractive, has no special
design or other features that could exist independently as a work of art. It is essentially a functional
bottle without a distinctive shape.”).
148
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eligible for copyright protection.154 If a work primarily serves utilitarian
purposes, its protection is the province of patent law.155 In the overall
scheme of intellectual property law, “technical” innovations belong in the
patent sphere while “artistic” contributions belong in the copyright
sphere.156
But, the practical implementation of this fundamental premise has
proven extremely difficult. To exclude useful articles from protection,
copyright law must draw a line between articles that serve a useful purpose
and those that are merely aesthetically pleasing. Here, once again, courts
are forced to engage in aesthetic evaluation.
The Copyright Act instructs courts to grant copyright protection only
if a work contains aesthetic features that “can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects.”157
Additionally, when a work’s useful and aesthetic features are so
intertwined that they cannot be separated physically, courts must consider

154

The 1976 Copyright Act provides the following definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works:
Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works include two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of
fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts,
diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include
works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects
are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Robert C. Hauhart, The Eternal
Wavering Line—The Continuing Saga of Mazer v. Stein, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 95, 104 n.52 (1983).
155
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979)
(stating that lighting fixtures designed with unusual elliptically shaped housings were not eligible for
copyright protection as works of art because there were no separately identifiable artistic elements). The
court noted that the 1976 Act found ineligible for copyright “the overall design or configuration of a
utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as functional considerations.” Id. at 804.
156
The seminal case is Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879). In Baker, the Court held that a
system of book-keeping is not copyright eligible subject-matter:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no
examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the
public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright. The claim to an invention or
discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the examination of the Patent Office
before an exclusive right therein can be obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the
government.
Id. at 102. On the problematic nature of granting copyright for useful articles, see, for example, Julie E.
Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1,
26–27 (2001) (“A variety of doctrines historically have served to channel certain sorts of innovation
(technical) into the patent sphere and other sorts (artistic) into the copyright sphere.”); Viva R. Moffat,
Mutant Copyright and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property
Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1512–13 (2004) (“Overlapping protection in these areas
disrupts both the patent and copyright bargains. Each of these bargains falls apart when an alternative
form of protection is available for the invention or creative work.”).
157
§ 101.
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whether there is conceptual separability between the form and function of a
work, with copyright extending only to the form.
To establish whether separate copyrightable features are present,
courts apply opposing artistic theories of interpretation, often mixing
various incompatible theories together in one decision. For instance, in
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the Second Circuit held that
the useful aspects of decorative belt buckles could be sufficiently separated
from their ornamental aesthetic features.158 In finding that the buckles in
question “rise to the level of creative art,”159 the court referred to the
intentions of the buckles’ creator.160 The court also invoked ReaderResponse theory by noting that the buckles were well received in art and
fashion circles,161 and by rejecting the notion that the utilitarian nature of
fashion items excludes them from copyright protection. “[B]ody
ornamentation has been an art form since the earliest days, as anyone who
has seen the Tutankhamen or Scythian gold exhibits at the Metropolitan
Museum will readily attest.”162 In other words, fashion items can be art
when they are perceived as such by society.
In a different decision by the same circuit, however, the court followed
a strict Formalist approach, finding that it was impossible to distinguish
between the expressive and useful aspects of human torso sculptures that
had been used as mannequins.163 The Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy
Cover Corp. court reasoned that mannequin forms are not aesthetic
creations because they conform to realistic proportions, e.g., “the life-size
configuration of the breasts and the width of the shoulders.”164 In a spirited
dissent, however, Judge Newman advocated a Reader-Response approach
to conceptual separability:
How, then, is “conceptual separateness” to be determined? In my view, the
answer derives from the word “conceptual.” For the design features to be
“conceptually separate” from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article that
embodies the design, the article must stimulate in the mind of the beholder a
158

632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 994.
160
Id. at 991 (“Explaining why he named the earlier buckle design ‘Winchester,’ the designer said
that he saw ‘in [his] mind’s eye a correlation between the art nouveau period and the butt of an antique
Winchester rifle’ and then ‘pulled these elements together graphically.’” (alteration in original)).
161
Id. (“Sales of both buckles were made primarily in high fashion stores and jewelry stores,
bringing recognition to appellant as a ‘designer.’ This recognition included a 1979 Coty American
Fashion Critics’ Award for his work in jewelry design as well as election in 1978 to the Council of
Fashion Designers of America. Both the Winchester and the Vaquero buckles, donated by appellant
after this lawsuit was commenced, have been accepted by the Metropolitan Museum of Art for its
permanent collection.”).
162
Id. at 994.
163
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985) (analysis based on
Formalism).
164
Id.
159
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concept that is separate from the concept evoked by its utilitarian function.
The test turns on what may reasonably be understood to be occurring in the
mind of the beholder or, as some might say, in the “mind’s eye” of the
beholder. This formulation requires consideration of who the beholder is and
when a concept may be considered “separate.”
I think the relevant beholder must be that most useful legal personage—the
ordinary, reasonable observer.165

Two years later, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber Co., an entirely different theory of artistic evaluation emerged in
the same circuit: the merger test.166 In denying copyright protection on the
Ribbon Bike Rack,167 Judge Oakes mixed together both Formalism and
Intentionalism, while explicitly rejecting a Reader-Response
interpretation.168 The court began with a strict formal analysis:
In creating the RIBBON Rack, the designer has clearly adapted the original
aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose. These
altered design features of the RIBBON Rack, including the spacesaving, open
design achieved by widening the upper loops to permit parking under as well
as over the rack’s curves, the straightened vertical elements that allow in- and
above-ground installation of the rack, the ability to fit all types of bicycles and
mopeds, and the heavy-gauged tubular construction of rustproof galvanized
steel, are all features that combine to make for a safe, secure, and
maintenance-free system of parking bicycles and mopeds. . . . Moreover, the
rack is manufactured from 2 3/8-inch standard steam pipe that is bent into
form, the six-inch radius of the bends evidently resulting from bending the
pipe according to a standard formula that yields bends having a radius equal to
three times the nominal internal diameter of the pipe.169

But then the court looked to the artist’s intentions, noting that “he did not
give any thought to the utilitarian application of any of his sculptures.”170
Ultimately, the court denied copyright protection to the Ribbon Rack
because the author had adapted the original aesthetic elements to
accommodate the sculpture’s purpose as a bicycle rack. As a result of these
adaptations, the sculpture no longer “reflect[ed] the unconstrained
165

Id. at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting).
834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). “[I]f design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and
functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be conceptually separable
from the utilitarian elements.” Id. (referencing Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design:
A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983)).
167
The Ribbon Bike Rack is a unique bicycle rack that consists of “graceful curves of tubular
steel.” RIBBON BIKE RACK, http://www.ribbonrack.com [http://perma.cc/535R-PSTN].
168
The court rejected the Reader-Response theory advocated by Judge Newman: “[I]t is not
enough that, to paraphrase Judge Newman, the rack may stimulate in the mind of the reasonable
observer a concept separate from the bicycle rack concept.” Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1146.
166
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perspective of the artist,”171 and it did not matter that the (altered) final
product was widely celebrated as a highly functional, creative design.172
As these opposing opinions of the Second Circuit illustrate,173 courts
face a difficult challenge determining conceptual separability. But by
randomly switching between major aesthetic theories that are theoretically
incompatible, courts make this challenge even more difficult for
themselves, and as a consequence, the case law fails to provide artists with
guidance as to the scope of protection available to such works.
D. Creative Transformations as Fair Use
Artistic determinations are inescapable when courts decide disputes
involving alleged fair uses of copyrighted material.174 Aesthetic sensitivity
is especially important to the first factor of the fair use test, which requires
courts to assess the “purpose and character” of a purported fair use.175 The
relevant inquiry is whether the allegedly infringing work merely
“‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the

171

Id. at 1145. For an application of the Second Circuit’s test by the Seventh Circuit, see Pivot
Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2004), which
determined that the design of a mannequin head meant to depict a fashion model satisfied conceptual
separability because the designer’s judgment was unaffected by functional concerns. See also
Mannequin Head Depicting “Hungry Look” High-Fashion Runway Model Is Protected by Copyright,
After All, Federal Appellate Court Rules, ENT. L. REP., Nov. 2004, at 18, available at
http://elr.carolon.net/BI/v26n06.pdf [http://perma.cc/6J79-U6LD] (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Pivot Point).
172
See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1146 (“The RIBBON Rack has been featured in Popular Science, Art
and Architecture, and Design 384 magazines, and it won an Industrial Designers Society of America
design award in the spring of 1980. In the spring of 1984 the RIBBON Rack was selected from 200
designs to be included among 77 of the designs exhibited at the Katonah Gallery in an exhibition
entitled ‘The Product of Design: An Exploration of the Industrial Design Process,’ an exhibition that
was written up in the New York Times.”).
173
See 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.3, at 99 (1989)
(“Of the many fine lines that run through the Copyright Act, none is more troublesome than the line
between protectable pictorial, graphic and sculptural works and unprotectable utilitarian elements of
industrial design.”). For an overview, see John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright Line Rule in
Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v.
Warner Bros., 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 301 (2005).
174
Following Article 107 of the Copyright Act, “fair” uses of copyrighted materials are not an
infringement of copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Courts must determine on a case-by-case basis
whether any particular use of the copyrighted work is fair. Id.
175
The judicially developed fair use test commands courts to consider at least four different aspects
of any fair use dispute:
(1) the purpose and character of the use; . . . (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id. In the words of Judge Leval, the first factor is “the soul of fair use.” Pierre N. Leval, Commentary,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1990).
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first with new expression, meaning, or message.”176 A fair use finding is
more likely if “the secondary use adds value to the original—if
copyrightable expression in the original work is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings.”177
Sometimes the determination of the “character” of an allegedly
infringing use is straightforward—e.g., when a work is copied verbatim.178
Many other disputes, however, involve situations in which a defendant has
integrated copyrighted material into a new creative work without
permission. In these instances, courts must dissect the “relationship”
between the original copyrighted material and the allegedly infringing work
to assess whether the use is “of the transformative type that advances
knowledge and the progress of the arts or whether it merely repackages,
free riding on another’s creations.”179
When drawing a line between new works that transform a preexisting
work and works that are more derivative in nature, courts must rely on
some comparative standard in order to evaluate the relationship between
the original and the infringing works. Here, again, courts knowingly or
inadvertently rely on aesthetic theories of interpretation. At times, courts
seek to decipher the author’s intentions. In Blanch v. Koons, for instance, a
fair use finding rested on the observation that:
Koons [was], by his own undisputed description, using Blanch’s image as
fodder for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass
media. His stated objective [was] thus not to repackage Blanch’s [artwork],
but to employ it “in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings.”180

176

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); id. (“[T]ransformative works . . . . lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of
breathing space . . . .”); see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
177
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Leval,
supra note 175, at 1111) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178
Even wholesale copying may qualify for fair use if the copied material is, for instance, not very
extensive or created for educational purposes. For examples of fair use determinations in this context,
see SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding fair use
where a seven-second clip from The Ed Sullivan Show was used in a staged musical history); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (E.D. Va. 1995) (finding fair use where the Washington
Post used three brief quotations from Church of Scientology texts). Short excerpts and news
commentary are not always granted fair use immunity, however. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562–63, 569 (1985) (holding that public interest in learning of that
political figure’s account of an historic event did not render fair use of an unpublished book); Ringgold
v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 77–81 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting fair use defense when a
copy of a poster of a quilt appeared in a sitcom for twenty-seven seconds).
179
Leval, supra note 175, at 1116.
180
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also id. at 255 (“The
question is whether Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch’s image . . . .”).
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At other times, courts resort to a more Formalistic mode of analysis in
order to appraise the purpose and character of the defendant’s work. For
instance, toy-maker Mattel sued the artist Tom Forsythe over a series of
seventy-eight photographs entitled Food Chain Barbie, depicting Barbie in
various absurd and often sexualized positions. The court analyzed Food
Chain Barbie’s configuration in great detail, focusing on the lighting,
background, props, and camera angles of the photographs.181
Occasionally, courts combine the concepts of Intentionalism and
Formalism. For example, the Eleventh Circuit applied formal analysis to
the configuration of a parody of Gone with the Wind to assess the
credibility of the authors’ stated objectives in the litigation—to destroy the
“perspective, judgments, and mythology of [Gone with the Wind],” which
is derisive of black people.182 The court’s formal analysis is illustrated by
the following passage in the decision:
Where Randall refers directly to Mitchell’s plot and characters, she does so
in service of her general attack on [Gone with the Wind]. In [Gone with the
181

Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802–03 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Forsythe turns
this image on its head, so to speak, by displaying carefully positioned, nude, and sometimes frazzled
looking Barbies in often ridiculous and apparently dangerous situations. His lighting, background,
props, and camera angles all serve to create a context for Mattel’s copyrighted work that transform
Barbie’s meaning. Forsythe presents the viewer with a different set of associations and a different
context for this plastic figure. In some of Forsythe’s photos, Barbie is about to be destroyed or harmed
by domestic life in the form of kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying her well known smile,
disturbingly oblivious to her predicament. As portrayed in some of Forsythe’s photographs, the
appliances are substantial and overwhelming, while Barbie looks defenseless.”). For other prominent
examples of Formalism in fair use parody disputes, see Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997). There, a holder of copyrights and trademarks for
children’s books brought action against a publisher that intended to publish a parody of the O.J.
Simpson murder trial written in the style of the books’ author:
While Simpson is depicted 13 times in the Cat’s distinctively scrunched and somewhat shabby red
and white stove-pipe hat, the substance and content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by
the focus on the Brown–Goldman murders or the O.J. Simpson trial. Because there is no effort to
create a transformative work with “new expression, meaning, or message,” the infringing work’s
commercial use further cuts against the fair use defense.
Id. (referencing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579)); see also Abilene Music, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc.,
320 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that rapper Ghostface Killah’s “sarcastic” use of
“What a Wonderful World” was protected as parody: “Where the most famous recording of Wonderful
World is lushly orchestrated, with strings playing the melody in a major key, evoking a feeling of peace
and harmony, The Forest’s version is recited a cappella, with a single male singer intoning the words
off-key, in a tone that might reasonably be perceived as sarcastic. The final line of the quotation, ‘And I
say to myself, what a wonderful world,’ sounds positively ominous: While in the original, the melody
ascends to the phrase ‘wonderful world,’ in The Forest, the entire line is intoned on a single note,
negating the optimistic, happy feeling created by the original.”).
182
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001) (establishing fair
use because the book is a critical statement that “seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments,
and mythology of [Gone with the Wind],” and stating that the “literary goal” of the author of the parody
was “to explode the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after the Civil
War”).
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Wind], Scarlett O’Hara often expresses disgust with and condescension
towards blacks; in [the parody], Other, Scarlett’s counterpart, is herself of
mixed descent. In [Gone with the Wind], Ashley Wilkes is the initial object of
Scarlett’s affection; in [the parody], he is homosexual. In [Gone with the
Wind], Rhett Butler does not consort with black female characters and is
portrayed as the captain of his own destiny. In [the parody], Cynara ends her
affair with Rhett’s counterpart, R., to begin a relationship with a black
Congressman; R. ends up a washed out former cad. In [the parody], nearly
every black character is given some redeeming quality—whether depth, wit,
cunning, beauty, strength, or courage—that their [Gone with the Wind]
analogues lacked.183

Other judicial decisions on fair use mirror the Reader-Response
theory. For instance, in the classic fair use decision involving 2 Live
Crew’s rap version of Roy Orbison’s song “Pretty Woman,” the Supreme
Court ultimately determined––based on a detailed eye-of-the-beholder
analysis––that 2 Live Crew’s song could reasonably be perceived by the
public as a comment on the original song.184
Lastly, in a recent decision involving fair use of photographs, the
Second Circuit applied all three major aesthetic theories.185 Parts of the
decision relied heavily on Intentionalist arguments by referring to the stated
intentions of the author.186 Other parts focused on Formalist elements
assessing the expressive nature of the work in reference to its
“composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and medi[um].”187 But
183

Id. at 1270–71 (footnote omitted).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582–83. The court held that the rap version of Roy Orbison’s classic
“Pretty Woman” could be perceived as a parody, explaining:
While we might not assign a high rank to the parodic element here, we think it fair to say that
2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it,
to some degree. 2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes
true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal
responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the naiveté of the original of an
earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugliness of street life and the
debasement that it signifies.
Id. at 583.
185
See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
186
Id. at 706–07 (“Prince’s deposition testimony further demonstrates his drastically different
approach and aesthetic from Cariou’s. Prince testified that he ‘[doesn’t] have any really interest in what
[another artist’s] original intent is because . . . what I do is I completely try to change it into something
that’s completely different. . . . I’m trying to make a kind of fantastic, absolutely hip, up to date,
contemporary take on the music scene.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Prince Dep. 338:4–339:3,
Oct. 6, 2009)). For a critical discussion of the case, see Anthony R. Enriquez, The Destructive Impulse
of Fair Use After Cariou v. Prince, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2014).
187
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (“Where Cariou’s serene and deliberately composed portraits and
landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs,
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative. Cariou’s black-andwhite photographs were printed in a 9 1/2" x 12" book. Prince has created collages on canvas that
incorporate color, feature distorted human and other forms and settings, and measure between ten and
nearly a hundred times the size of the photographs. Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color
184
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ultimately, the court grounded its fair use finding in arguments that closely
resembled Reader-Response (how the work “appears to the reasonable
observer”).188
Again, the problem is not that courts draw from aesthetics in their
opinions—this is unavoidable—but rather that they so often switch
between, and blend together, incompatible theories. Is a work
transformative because of the configuration of its elements, because the
stated intentions of its author are clear and credible, or because of how it
will be understood by its audience? Aesthetic theory teaches that each of
these questions is valid in certain contexts, but if courts ask them all
together it leads to a doctrinal donnybrook. As such, copyright doctrine is
in desperate need of a uniform, coherent approach to deciding which is the
right question to ask.
III. A “COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE” PROPOSAL
Surprisingly, the answer to this riddle can be drawn from its source:
Bleistein. Courts have often read Justice Holmes’s warning as a general
proscription on aesthetic determinations.189 But Bleistein may be read more
narrowly so as only to constrain aesthetic determinations in instances
where judges are “trained only to the law.”190 By implication, if a judge
were trained in aesthetics as well as law, then it would be permissible under
Bleistein for her to apply her aesthetic knowledge in settling a dispute.191
Indeed, Holmes specifically envisioned that judges would do so, saying
that even judges who lack artistic education may make aesthetic
determinations within “the narrowest and most obvious limits.”192 Thus,
although many courts have read Bleistein as mandating an avoidance of
aesthetic questions, Holmes’s language in the case supports the opposite
conclusion: courts may make aesthetic judgments so long as they are
sufficiently well-informed.193
palette, and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the photographs, as is the
expressive nature of Prince’s work.”).
188
Id. at 707 (“What is critical is how the work in question appears to the reasonable observer, not
simply what an artist might say about a particular piece or body of work. Prince’s work could be
transformative even without commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without Prince’s
stated intention to do so. Rather than confining our inquiry to Prince’s explanations of his artworks, we
instead examine how the artworks may ‘reasonably be perceived’ in order to assess their transformative
nature.”).
189
See Farley, supra note 9, at 817.
190
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (emphasis added).
191
See Farley, supra note 9, at 817–18.
192
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
193
See Farley, supra note 9, at 818. Some courts have done precisely that. See, e.g., Leibovitz v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (likening a magazine photograph of actress
Demi Moore naked and pregnant to Botticelli’s Birth of Venus, including a complete art-historical
iconography of the “Venus Pudica” pose).
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However, it is not enough for courts merely to be conversant in art and
art history. To avoid the discrepancies that have resulted from applying
aesthetic theory in an ad hoc manner,194 courts need to adopt a more
consistent methodology for analyzing aesthetic questions. The simplest
method would be for the Supreme Court to nominate a single aesthetic
theory that would apply in all cases where aesthetic questions arise.195 But
such a bright-line approach is undesirable for at least two reasons. First, no
single aesthetic theory is sufficiently broad to account for all manifestations
of artistic practice.196 Therefore, to give preference to one aesthetic theory
over all others would result in some forms of art being incorrectly
interpreted and potentially disregarded. Additionally, establishing a rigid
precedent for aesthetic judgments would reduce artistic diversity,
foreclosing novel expressive forms that deviate from the theoretical
standard.197 As such, a Court-sanctioned aesthetic theory could operate as a
covert form of censorship that would chill aesthetic innovation, just as
Justice Holmes feared.198
For instance, suppose the Court were to adopt Formalism as its
exclusive aesthetic theory.199 In this scenario, courts could make aesthetic
distinctions solely on the basis of the precise configuration of a work’s
elements that provoke “aesthetic emotion,” e.g., size, shape, color, meter,
timbre, rhythm, pattern, etc.200 Courts would not be permitted to consider
the artist’s state of mind or intention in creating the work.201 If a court were
194

See supra Part III; see also Yen, supra note 22, at 298 (“[F]amiliarity with aesthetic theory
shows that courts are essentially swapping one set of aesthetic premises for others in response to the
facts of particular cases.”).
195
See Yen, supra note 22, at 300.
196
Compare BELL, supra note 31, at 17 (defining a formalist approach to art criticism), with
Beardsley, supra note 34, at 21 (“[A]n artwork is something produced with the intention of giving it the
capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest.”), and DICKIE, supra note 36, at 35–37 (arguing that an object
becomes art when it is presented to members of the art world for aesthetic consideration).
197
See ROSENBERG, supra note 85, at 12 (“No one can say with assurance what a work of art is—
or, more important, what is not a work of art.”); Danto, supra note 36, at 572–75 (discussing the
aesthetic differences between Pop Art and Modern Art); cf. Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property
and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1853,
1864–77 (1991) (arguing that intellectual property rights control the meaning of texts and suppress
unapproved meanings created by certain readers and users of the texts).
198
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“[C]opyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public . . . —it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.”).
199
It would do this perhaps on the basis that Formalism most closely corresponds to the
interpretative approach followed by most lay observers. See Yen, supra note 22, at 262.
200
See supra notes 31–46 and accompanying text.
201
See, e.g., BELL, supra note 31, at 19 (“In pure aesthetics we have only to consider our emotion
and its object: for the purposes of aesthetics we have no right, neither is there any necessity, to pry
behind the object into the state of mind of him who made it.”); see also Clement Greenberg, Modernist
Painting, in ART IN THEORY: 1900-1990: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CHANGING IDEAS 754–60 (Charles
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then to apply this analytical framework to Marcel Duchamp’s
“readymade”202 sculpture Fountain203—widely considered the most
influential artwork of the twentieth century204—the piece would fail to
qualify as art. From a Formalist perspective, the physical qualities of
Fountain are indistinguishable from a mere functional object (i.e., a urinal),
so it lacks formal elements that would bring about an aesthetic
experience.205 As such, if courts followed Formalism exclusively, they
would be blinded to many of the aesthetic innovations that have informed
twentieth- and twenty-first-century creative practice.206 This blindness, in
turn, would have a considerable chilling effect on future concept-based
works that deemphasize the making of aesthetically pleasing objects in
favor of expressions of art as an idea.207
Suppose, instead, that the Court were to choose Intentionalism as its
preferred aesthetic theory. This theoretical orientation would admit a far
greater range of expressive practices than would Formalism.208 However,

Harrison & Paul Woods eds., 1993); Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 89, at 18 (arguing that an
author’s intended meaning is irrelevant to the analysis of a literary work).
202
A readymade is an “ordinary object elevated to the dignity of a work of art by the mere choice
of an artist.” See ANDRÉ BRETON & PAUL ÉLUARD, DICTIONNAIRE ABRÉGÉ DU SURRÉALISME
(Surrealist Dictionary) (1938), available at http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Articles/obalk.html
[http://perma.cc/PRR8-5FR5].
203
For this piece, Duchamp purchased a standard, mass-produced porcelain urinal, turned it on its
side, signed the base using the pseudonym “R. Mutt,” and exhibited it as the “readymade” sculpture.
See CALVIN TOMKINS, DUCHAMP: A BIOGRAPHY 181 (1996). A provocation against then-prevailing
artistic standards that favored the visual sophistication of an artwork over the originality of its ideas,
Duchamp intended Fountain and his other readymade pieces to extend the types of expressive works
considered to be art. See id. at 186. Perhaps not surprisingly, Fountain has retained its ability to provoke
into the present day. See, e.g., STEPHEN HICKS, EXPLAINING POSTMODERNISM: SKEPTICISM AND
SOCIALISM FROM ROUSSEAU TO FOUCAULT 196 (2004) (“The artist is a not great creator—Duchamp
went shopping at a plumbing store. The artwork is not a special object—it was mass-produced in a
factory. The experience of art is not exciting and ennobling—at best it is puzzling and mostly leaves
one with a sense of distaste. But over and above that, Duchamp did not select just any ready-made
object to display. In selecting the urinal, his message was clear: Art is something you piss on.”).
204
See Duchamp’s Urinal Tops Art Survey, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2004, 5:56 PM), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4059997.stm [http://perma.cc/B7Y3-Y9PS].
205
BELL, supra note 31, at 17–18; see also Yen, supra note 22, at 253.
206
See Jerry Saltz, Idol Thoughts: The Glory of Fountain, Marcel Duchamp’s Ground-Breaking
“Moneybags Piss Pot,” VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 21, 2006), http://www.villagevoice.com/2006-0221/art/idol-thoughts/ [http://perma.cc/52RV-7C6X].
207
Examples include Dada, Minimalism, Process Art, Performance Art, Conceptual Art,
Appropriation Art, and more. See generally JONATHAN FINEBERG, ART SINCE 1940: STRATEGIES OF
BEING 14–17 (3rd ed. 2000); LUCY LIPPARD, SIX YEARS: THE DEMATERIALIZATION OF THE ART
OBJECT (1973); IRVING SANDLER, ART OF THE POSTMODERN ERA: FROM THE LATE 1960S TO THE
EARLY 1990S, at 332–74 (1996) (cataloguing various art-making strategies that deemphasize the
aesthetic qualities of a work of art for its intellectual content).
208
Though, interestingly, under a strict Intentionalism aesthetic Duchamp’s Fountain would still
fail to qualify as art, on the basis that the producer of the urinal did not create it with the intent that it be
displayed as an art object. See Yen, supra note 22, at 258.
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discovering the substantive meaning of a work from its author’s professed
intentions would create significant evidentiary problems and opportunities
for outright chicanery. For instance, it would be difficult to divine with any
measure of precision the exact intentions of a deceased or otherwise
unavailable artist.209 Further, artists might disclaim having had artistic
intentions,210 be unable to adequately express what their artistic intentions
were, or strategically reimagine their intentions ex post facto to benefit
their litigation posture. And, perhaps most importantly, artists’ intentions
might not align with the actual result of their labors, as is the case with socalled happy accidents.211 Such inferential and evidentiary challenges are
not insurmountable; criminal courts regularly overcome similar obstacles to
ascertain a defendant’s mens rea. But given that courts are reluctant to
engage in aesthetic thought generally, the adoption of an Intentionalist
standard would likely be met with steep resistance.
An alternative way that courts might approach aesthetic judgments is
through the lens of the “ordinary observer” test used to determine
substantial similarity.212 This test does not involve analytic “dissection and
expert testimony,”213 but rather depends on whether the accused work has
appropriated the “total concept and feel” of the copyrighted work.214 So,
rather than surveying different theories in order to map the best aesthetic
topography for a particular work, courts would instead address questions of
law in the same way that juries address questions of fact: by relying upon
their intuitive sense of whether the “aesthetic appeal of the work is the
same” to the eyes of a lay observer.215
The problems with this approach, however, are myriad. For one, use of
an ordinary observer test in this way would only perpetuate the doctrinal

209

See Wimsatt & Beardsley, supra note 89, at 18.
See, e.g., Harold Rosenberg, The Art World: De-Aestheticization, NEW YORKER, Jan. 24, 1970,
at 62–67 (discussing Robert Morris, who signed a statement disclaiming any aesthetic content in one of
his works).
211
See, e.g., Liz Massey, Embracing Creative Failure (II): Cultivating Happy Accidents,
REATIVE
LIBERTY (Jan. 24, 2009), http://creativeliberty.wordpress.com/2009/01/24/embracingC
creative-failure-ii-cultivating-happy-accidents/ [http://perma.cc/5RP8BD8S].
212
Here, we speak of substantial similarity in the sense of the comparison made between works for
purposes of ascertaining whether misappropriation has occurred, as opposed to the use of substantial
similarity (also termed “probative” or “striking” similarity) to determine whether copying has occurred.
See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“If evidence of access is absent, the
similarities must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently
arrived at the same result.”).
213
Id.
214
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165–67 (9th Cir. 1977).
215
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (“[T]he
ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”).
210
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inconsistencies discussed above.216 A work’s “total concept and feel” is
inherently subject to the quirks of individual taste and sophistication, and
so decisions of law based on it are no more likely to be consistent than
decisions subscribing to the doctrine of avoidance.217 Both approaches
result in courts making ad hoc aesthetic determinations that provide little
guidance to future litigants, or to the law generally. Likewise, for all its
shortcomings, the doctrine of avoidance at least has the benefit of imposing
a measure of judicial modesty that guards against the dangers of
discrimination and chilling that worried Justice Holmes.218
Furthermore, the ordinary observer test is itself theoretically
problematic. At its connotative root, the “total concept and feel” test219
evokes incompatible aesthetic views. For instance, the “concept” of a work
cannot be established merely from its formal qualities. Rather, the trier of
fact must consider external references such as an author’s professed
intentions, contemporaneous artistic practices, art history, social mores,
cultural symbols, and more.220 Because of this, consideration of a work’s
concept necessitates the use of Intentionalism or Reader-Response theory
(and most likely both).221 By contrast, the “feel” of a work might come
directly from the work’s aesthetic qualities (Formalism),222 or it could be
influenced by the context in which the work is received (ReaderResponse).223 Therefore, by requiring both concept and feel, the ordinary
observer test implicitly creates an aesthetic dissonance that cannot be
resolved harmoniously by courts.
Luckily, these difficulties can largely be avoided by reorienting the
debate from what aesthetic theory should be applied to how courts should
go about applying any aesthetic theory—in other words, by shifting the
question from the substantive to the procedural. This reorientation can be
achieved through the judicial adoption224 of a “Community of Practice”
standard for aesthetic questions.225
216

See supra Part III.
See supra Part II.A (discussing the doctrine of avoidance).
218
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
219
See Roth Greeting Cards, 429 F.2d at 1110.
220
See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Farley, supra note 9, at 844 (discussing the
“institutional approach” to defining art).
221
See, e.g., Beardsley, supra note 34, at 21; see also Farley, supra note 9, at 843.
222
See Yen, supra note 22, at 253.
223
For instance, a musician playing the same piece in a train station or in a concert hall will elicit a
completely different “feel” from the audience. See Gene Weingarten, Pearls Before Breakfast: Can One
of the Nation’s Great Musicians Cut Through the Fog of a D.C. Rush Hour? Let’s Find Out, WASH.
POST MAG., Apr. 8, 2007 (describing experiment conducted in which violin virtuoso Joshua Bell played
on a D.C. Metro train platform and was mostly ignored by commuters).
224
An argument could be made here that courts are logically inconsistent in their decisionmaking
in copyright cases not because of deficiencies in copyright doctrine, but because judges decide based on
intuitive or normative considerations rather than reflection upon abstract principles, aesthetic or
217
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Our proposed Community of Practice method operates in two steps.
First, the court, as briefed by the parties, would outline the general
community of artistic practice from which the works in question hail. This
community could be the artworld of mainstream museums, galleries,
critics, etc., but it need not be so. All that is required is that the community
be an accurate reflection of the aesthetic norms and traditions that informed
the works.
Second, a hypothetical viewer is imagined who is part of the
Community of Practice and possesses aesthetic insights that are appropriate
to the interpretative questions at issue. For instance, this viewer may be the
“ideal reader” of a given text,226 or may represent a consensus of aesthetic
views held by persons that have studied the arts or literature.227 Or the
viewer could be unfamiliar with mainstream artistic theory and practice, as
would be appropriate when dealing with outsider art228 or works based in
specific cultural traditions.229 In this way, the hypothetical viewer would
not be limited to any specific aesthetic theory, just as a real person might
alter their aesthetic criteria as they move from gallery to gallery in a
museum—or from a museum out into the street. The viewer would adopt
whichever theory is most sensitive to the nature of the work presented. For
instance, a viewer might offer a Formalist account of a work of twelve-tone
music,230 whereas they would likely apply an Intentionalist critique to a

otherwise. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2010); cf. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND
MODERN MIND 108–09 (Peter Smith 1930) (arguing that judicial decisions were primarily
motivated by the psychological influences on the judges). This is a fair point. However, because a
thorough unpacking of this criticism is beyond the scope of this Article, we will not answer this
criticism except to say that even if judges do ultimately decide based on exogenous factors, having a
more rigorous analytical framework for them to contend with on the way is likely to ultimately yield
greater doctrinal consistency overall.
225
This proposed standard is similar in some ways to the Reader-Response “intended audience”
test. See supra notes 108–16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Reader-Response theory. But
see Yen, supra note 22, at 294–95 (noting that “intended audience” tests have three basic problems: (1)
“authors may not have specific audiences in mind when they create a work”; (2) “the audience that
forms the market . . . may not be the audience the author intended”; and (3) “the people for whom an
author intends his work are still prone to disagree over the proper interpretation of the work”).
226
“The ideal reader would . . . be a person who knows everything about social conventions of
interpretation and applies them correctly when reading a text.” Yen, supra note 22, at 265; see also
CULLER, supra note 112, at 123–24.
227
See DICKIE, supra note 36, at 68.
228
See supra note 117 and accompanying text for a discussion of outsider art.
229
See, e.g., WILLIAM ARNETT ET AL., THE QUILTS OF GEE’S BEND (2002); GLEN C. DAVIES,
STRANGER IN PARADISE: THE WORK OF REVEREND HOWARD FINSTER (2010).
230
See generally GEORGE PERLE, SERIAL COMPOSITION AND ATONALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE MUSIC OF SCHOENBERG, BERG, AND WEBERN (6th ed. rev. 1991); RUDOLPH RETI, TONALITY,
ATONALITY, PANTONALITY: A STUDY OF SOME TRENDS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC (1958); see
also Greenberg, supra note 31.
THE
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piece of Appropriation Art.231 Once the hypothetical viewer’s aesthetic
orientation is established,232 a court can answer questions presented based
on the expected response of a viewer from the Community of Practice. As
such, the Community of Practice method provides a more exact means of
settling aesthetic disputes in a consistent and astute manner than the current
ad hoc arrangement.
While the exact parameters of the Community of Practice standard
proposed here are novel, precursors can be found throughout copyright law,
most notably in Arnstein v. Porter.233 There, to determine whether wellknown songwriter Cole Porter infringed on the plaintiff’s songs, the
appellate court directed the lower court to consider the aesthetic views of
real people (“lay listeners”) in terms of “what is pleasing to the ears of lay
listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is
composed.”234 By the court’s reckoning, not all lay opinions are equally
valid. It was the aesthetic views of those who “comprise the audience” for
the songs that mattered to the disposition of the case.235 Thus, the Arnstein
court implicitly set out a selection procedure for determining which lay
opinions a court should heed: an “intended audience” test.236 This intended
audience need not be made up of actual persons who are familiar with the
works at issue (say, a jury made up of Cole Porter fans), but rather may be
inferred from expert testimony as to the presumed reactions of listeners for
whom the songs were written.237 In other words, the intended audience is a
composite built from the nature of the work itself (e.g., this song was
written for that type of person) and the contexts in which the work might be
presented.
Our proposed interpretative scheme also bears resemblance to the legal
fiction of the “person having ordinary skill in the art” standard used in
patent law.238 As with all legal fictions, the purpose of the hypothetical

231

See, e.g., Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Judicial Activism and the Return of Formalism in the
Cariou v. Prince Decision, CLANNCO (Apr. 29, 2013), http://clancco.com/wp/2013/04/art-law-cariouprince-copyright/ [http://perma.cc/J2BG-W7H8]; see also Danto, supra note 36.
232
Either by the parties in the pleadings, or by the court sua sponte.
233
154 F.2d 464, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946).
234
Id. (emphasis added).
235
Id.; see also Yen, supra note 22, at 293.
236
See Yen, supra note 22, at 293 (“This implies that the relevant opinions about substantial
similarity are those held by the people at whom the works in question are aimed.”); Tolhurst, supra note
35, at 12 (stating that the correct meaning of a text is the “intention which a member of the intended
audience would be most justified in attributing to the author based on the knowledge and attitudes
which he possess in virtue of being a member of the intended audience”).
237
See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 472–73; see also Yen, supra note 22, at 293.
238
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if the differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious before the effective filing date of the invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
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viewer is not to mimic how an actual person might respond to a given work
of art, but rather to develop a baseline understanding of what a person from
the Community of Practice would see as aesthetically valuable. Moreover,
just as the standard for reasonableness in torts is adaptable to changing
circumstances, so, too, would a Community of Practice standard be
responsive to artistic innovation without sacrificing judicial consistency.
Our proposed standard is objective in the sense that it is not the opinion of
the court or the jury that disposes of the question, but rather what they
objectively reckon a member of the Community of Practice would think
under the circumstances.239
It should be noted that our proposal embraces some measure of
Formalism, albeit of process rather than substance. It is important to
recognize that not all formalisms are equivalent. As discussed above, the
application of aesthetic Formalism provides little (if any) method for
understanding works that do not rely on formal considerations as part of
their aesthetic processes, such as Conceptual Art, Punk, or Cinema Verité.
Procedural formalism does not have this effect. Just because a formal
process is followed to determine what standards to apply to a given piece of
work does not mean that the standard applied will always (or ever) be
Formalism. Indeed, a court following the Community of Practice Standard
could just as easily decide that Intentionalism, or Reader-Response, or
some other theory not yet developed, is the best method for comparing two
works of art. In other words, rigor in method can yield flexibility in
thought.240
While this standard would still leave a measure of unpredictability as
to the outcome of aesthetic questions,241 it would nevertheless help to
rectify the confusion that arises when art is hauled into a courtroom. First,
litigants would be aware of the analytical procedure used to settle aesthetic
questions ex ante, which would facilitate bargaining and extrajudicial
dispute resolution, as litigants would have a clearer sense of the merits of

which the claimed invention pertains.”); see also KSR, Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421
(2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
239
This mirrors the objectively reasonable person standard in torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 263 (1965).
240
Properly conceived, our proposal provides a framework for thinking through aesthetic questions
in a consistent manner while allowing for some differentiation across legal questions. For example,
when faced with a fair use question, the Community of Practice would almost always consider
Intentionalism as a primary aesthetic theory because intent is central to the inquiry in the first factor of
the fair use test—i.e., Did the author intend their work to be transformative or not? See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2012).
241
But see supra note 194 and accompanying text for reasons why a bright-line approach to
aesthetic questions would be undesirable.
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their claims.242 Second, the Community of Practice standard would help
allay courts’ fears of engaging in aesthetic determinations by providing a
methodology for systematically sifting through art theory and historical
literature and for obtaining input from experts, practitioners, and amici.243
For instance, courts could go about defining the Community of Practice in
a manner roughly analogous to the way that patent examiners go about
surveying the prior art to determine whether an invention is nonobvious.244
Lastly, the Community of Practice standard would serve to promote
artistic innovation by establishing clearer guidelines for artists and their
counsel,245 which would likely have the salutary effect of increasing artistic
production, as artists would have a better idea of what is—and isn’t—
protected by copyright.246 In sum, under this proposed framework, courts
would approach aesthetic questions in much the same way they approach
an individual’s conduct in tort: under this set of (aesthetic) circumstances,
what actions are to be reasonably expected, and how should a reasonably
informed person respond?
CONCLUSION
It is worth remembering that courts adopted the doctrine of
avoidance247 for a noble reason: “The taste of any public is not to be treated
with contempt.”248 As Justice Holmes asserted, and subsequent courts have
been keenly aware,249 artistic pursuits are different from other endeavors,
sharing more with the dark machinery of the human spirit than the
quotidian matters that are courts’ normal concern. And it is precisely the
242
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cultivation and preservation of these enigmatic and unruly forces that is the
animating purpose of copyright law.250 It is thus proper for courts to
exercise humility and restraint when addressing questions that could
irreparably harm the creative process. The adverse effects of judicial
overreach that Justice Holmes imagined251—discrimination, chilling effects,
or even covert censorship—remain as virulent today as they were in
1903.252
Yet, for all its commonsense appeal and apparent virtue, the doctrine
of avoidance does more harm than good.253 Copyright law demands that
courts actively engage with aesthetic issues, and no amount of evasion can
change this fact.254 This feature of copyright is neither an unfortunate
byproduct of misguided doctrine nor the result of the inevitable vagaries of
litigation. Rather it is at the very heart of the constitutional imperative that
copyright must answer: What is the best way to promote progress in the
arts?255
Courts must engage with aesthetic questions because artists need
guidance about the legal protections copyright affords,256 not because jurists
are superior arbiters of aesthetic controversy,257 but because artists and arts
communities suffer in the absence of a clear map to the contours of
copyright law.258 When confusion and misunderstanding of the law abound,
the result is unwarranted fear and anxiety among artists that result in a
reluctance to undertake projects that venture towards uncertain legal
terrain.259 In this way, the social ills that Justice Holmes sought to prevent
have ironically come to pass precisely because of aesthetic avoidance and
the doctrinal confusion it produces.260 For this reason, if for no other, courts
must accept their responsibility to fully engage with aesthetic theory and
practice—the law commands it, and artistic progress requires it. To this
end, our Community of Practice proposal provides a way for courts to
250
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adopt a uniform approach to aesthetic judgments that will provide doctrinal
lucidity, improve ex ante certainty, and promote artistic innovation.
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